The post-Watergate era of public morality has, at least temporarily, led Americans to demand higher standards from public officials in both their official and unofficial conduct. Everything from the abuse of official power, to tax returns, to the personal morals of public officials has become a matter of public concern. But public officials are not the only ones to feel the impact of the new post-Watergate standards. Partially as a result of corporate involvement in the Watergate scandal, the activities of corporations and corporate officials have also come under increased scrutiny.
During the summer of 1973, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began to cooperate closely with. the Watergate Special Prosecutor's office. The IRS initiated a special program designed to uncover "tax violations committed by donors or recipients of campaign contributions, primarily in the 1972 Presidential campaign."' Aided by information from the IRS, the Watergate Special Prosecutor's investigations into illegal corporate campaign contributions resulted in a number of guilty pleas by corporate officials and corporations. 2 On April 7, 1976, the IRS expanded the scope of its investigation beyond its original Watergate focus on domestic campaign contributions to cover both foreign and domestic bribes, kickbacks and campaign contributions. The IRS issued a new set of instructions to its field offices requiring that the examining offices ask a minimum of eleven questions to present and past corporate officials and employees. 3 The instructions require that the
I WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, RE-
PORT 220 (Oct. 1975) . 2 The Watergate Special Prosecutor reported that 18 corporate officials and 17 corporations had pled guilty to violations of campaign contribution laws. Id. at 158-59. ' The full text of the 11 questions follows: 1. Did the corporation, any corporate officer or employee or any third party acting on behalf of the corporation, make, directly or indirectly, any bribes, kickbacks or other payments regardless of form, whether in money, property or services to any employee, person, company or organization, or any representative of any person, company or organization to obtain favora-59 questions be asked in the IRS's large case audits. which cover approximately 1200 major corporations, each of which has gross assets ble treatment in securing business or to otherwise obtain special concessions, or to pay for favorable treatment for business secured or for special concessions already obtained? 2. Did the corporation, any corporate officer or employee or any third party acting on behalf of the corporation, make any bribes, kickbacks or other payments regardless of form whether in money, property or services, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of any government official or employee, domestic or foreign, whether on the national level or a lower level such as state, county or local (in the case of a foreign government also including any level inferior to the national level) and including regulatory agencies or governmentally-controlled businesses, corporations, companies or societies, for the purpose of affecting his/her action or the action of the government he/she represents to obtain favorable treatment in securing business or to obtain special concessions, or to pay for business secured or special concessions obtained in the past? 3. Were corporate funds donated, loaned or made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the use or benefit of, or for the purpose of opposing, any government or subdivision thereof, political party, candidate or committee either domestic or foreign?
4. Was corporate property of any kind donated, loaned, or made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the use or benefit of, or for the purpose of opposing, any government or subdivision thereof, political party, candidate or committee either domestic or foreign?
5. Was any corporate officer or employee compensated, directly or indirectly, by the corporation for time spent or expenses incurred in performing services for the benefit of or for the purpose of opposing, any'government or subdivision thereof, political party, candidate or committee, either domestic or foreign?
6. Did the corporation make any loans, donations or other disbursements, directly or indirectly, to corporate officers or employees or others for the purpose of making contributions, directly or indirectly, for the use or benefit of, or for the purpose of opposing, any government or subdivision thereof, political party, candidate or committee, either domestic or foreign?
7. Did the corporation make any loans, donations or other disbursements directly or indirectly, to corporate officers or employees or exceeding $250,000,000.1 The questions will be asked of "those who can reasonably be expected to have had knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of any such scheme." 5 The eleven questions place no duty to investigate the facts on the corporate officers and employees. They are expected to answer only "to the best of their knowledge, belief and recollection." 6 The first two questions deal with bribes and kickbacks to government officials and to private individuals and companies. Questions three and four inquire whether corporate funds or property were used to support or oppose any foreign or domestic political party or candidate. The next three questions ask whether the corothers for the purpose of reimbursing such corporate officers, employees or others for contributions made, directly or indirectly, for the use or benefit of, or for the purpose of opposing, any government or subdivision thereof, political party, candidate or committee, either domestic or foreign? 8. Does now or did any corporate officer or employee or any third party acting on behalf of the domestic corporation have signatory or other authority or control over disbursements from foreign bank accounts? 9. Does now or did the corporation maintain a bank account or any other account of any kind, either domestic or foreign, which account was not reflected on the corporate books, records, balance sheets, or financial statements? 10. Does now or did the corporation or any other person or entity acting on behalf of the corporation maintain a domestic or foreign numbered account or an account in a name other than the name of the corporation?
11. Which other present or former corporate officers, directors, employees, or other persons acting on behalf of the corporation may have knowledge concerning any of the above areas;, Internal Revenue News Release IR-1590 IR- , [1976 9 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) T 6567. 4 The 11 questions will also be addressed to ,smaller corporations if warranted by the facts and circumstances in a particular case." Internal Revenue News Release IR-1615 IR- , [1976 poration compensated its officers or employees for services rendered or contributions made to support or oppose any foreign or domestic political party or candidate. Questions eight, nine and ten probe whether the corporation has or controls a foreign bank account, and if so, whether the account is reflected on the books of the corporation and whether the account is in the corporation's own name. Question eleven seeks the identity of present or former corporate officers, directors or employees who might have information about any of the preceding questions.
Based on responses from 896 of the 1200 corporations in its eleven question investigation, the IRS issued a preliminary report which indicated that it had uncovered 481 potentially illegal corporate slush funds and 71 potential cases of criminal fraud. The IRS received no response from 304 corporations. Summonses were to be sent to the officers and employees of these corporations to obtain their responses to the questions. As might be expected, corporate officials are not always willing to answer the eleven questions. Irrespective of any wrongdoing by the corporation or its officers and employees, the questions are themselves viewed as offensive.
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According to some corporate executives, the "questionable activities" which the questions are designed to uncover are necessary to prevent the corporation from being placed at a competitive disadvantage, particularly in its foreign operations.
9 Furthermore, they fear that the 7 DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA), June 6, 1977, at G-7-8.
" The American Bar Association's Section on Taxation viewed the 11 questions as provoking hostility between the business community and the IRS. The Section on Taxation considered that the 11 questions unfairly cast suspicion on the corporate officers and employees of the nation's largest corporations. 23, 29 (1976) . The scope of the questions was also a source of aggravation. The questions were termed "vague, ambiguous and extraordinarily broad." Id. at 32.
9 Disclosure of questionable payments to the IRS would most likely be accompanied by disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and eventual public disclosure to the corporation's shareholders and the general public. Under § § 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 78m, 78o(d) (1970) , an issuer of registered securities is required to file reports which the SEC deems necessary and appropriate for the protection of [Vol, 69 COMMWENTS CORPORATE SLUSH FUNDS Sales, Big Companies Report, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 6 (midwest ed.) . It is possible that there has been a loss of bribe-related foreign sales but that this loss is offset by a postrecession increase in the level of foreign business activity. Another possibility is that some of the questionable payments are simply continuing in another form. Id.
10 Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 9, at 42-43. In one instance one country declared that improper payments made by an oil company in a second country motivated the first country to expropriate the oil company's properties. SECURITIES has made illegal payments may cause the officers responsible for making, authorizing or simply allowing the payments to lose their jobs." Finally, of course, it is clear that answers to the questions which disclose corporate bribes, kickbacks and illegal campaign contributions could subject the corporations to back taxes, penalties and fines and its officers and employees to fines and jail sentences.
2
The possibility that an officer or employee may subject himself to criminal liability by an-" For example, the revelation of Gulf Oil Corporation's illegal payments led to the ouster of four high-ranking Gulf executives, including Gulf's chair- Penalties would be assessed for failure to pay the tax due. I.R.C. § 6653. The corporation could also be fined for attempting to evade or defeat the tax. I.R.C. § 7201. The corporate officers and employees might be fined or imprisoned for attempting to evade or defeat the tax. I.R.C. § 7201.
In addition to the Internal Revenue Code sanctions, the corporation and its officers and employees might also be subject to fines and imprisonment for violations of non-tax laws. Potentially applicable statutes include: 2 U.S.C. swering the eleven questions suggests that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination should be available to the corporate officers and employees who are asked to respond to the questions. This comment will consider the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination to the corporation's employees and officers, the proper time for claiming the privilege, and the adequacy of a grant of immunity for corporate officials reluctant to answer the eleven questions.
AVAILABILITY OF THE PRIVILEGE
Determining whether a corporate official may claim the fifth amendment privilege when confronted with the eleven questions requires an understanding of the policies underlying the privilege and a consideration of the exceptional situations in which the privilege is not available. The privilege has been hailed as "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized. According to the Court, one of the fundamental values was "our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt."' 6 A second value which the privilege protects is "respect for the integrity and worth of the individual citizen.' 7 Historically, the origin of the privilege is "closely linked with the abolition of torture," 8 and the fifth amendment reflects our founding fathers' conscious selection of an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial criminal process. A third value which the privilege fosters is respect for the integrity of the criminal justice system. If the privilege were not available, the government might be tempted to rely progressively less on thorough, factual investigations and increasingly on its power to extract answers as a means to dispose of crimi-I" E. GRISWOLD However, while the role of the fifth amendment in protecting personal privacy has often been affirmed by the Supreme Court 2 3 most recently the Court has shown a tendency to limit the fifth amendment's function as a protector of privacy .24 Although the privilege both reflects and protects values which our society considers of fundamental importance, the utilization of the privilege clearly impairs the government's ability to obtain vital information. Aware of the tension between the government's need for information and the individual's privilege ,9 Wigmore felt that under a system of compulsory self-disclosure, the criminal justice system tended to "suffer morally." He stated:
The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation of other sources. The exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power. S. 391 (1976) , the Court acknowledged that protecting personal privacy was "one of several purposes served by the constitutional privilege against compelled testimonial self-incrimination." Id. at 399. But the Court maintained that it "has never suggested that every invasion of privacy violates the privilege." Id. justice Brennan disagreed sharply with the majority's interpretation of privacy as a mere "by-product" of the fifth amendment and not as a "factor controlling in part the determination of the scope of the privilege." Id. at 416 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). See id. at 414-28.
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against self-incrimination, the courts have in two situations recognized exceptions to the right to claim the privilege. The first involves access to corporate records. Under the corporate records exception, the corporation may not claim the privilege3 5 However, the IRS's 2 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) . Given an understanding of the values which the fifth amendment seeks to foster (see text accompanying notes 13-24 supra), it can be readily seen why the courts have consistently denied the corporation access to the privilege. First, the privilege is unavailable to the corporation because the corporation's right to privacy is not impaired. In Hale, the Court held that a corporation could not resist a subpoena on fifth amendment grounds. The Court considered the corporation to be a "creature of the state ... incorporated for the benefit of the public." 201 U.S. at 74. The corporation receives privileges from the state and "holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law." Id. Thus, unlike the individual who has rights which exist without any action by the state, the corporation does not have a right of privacy which can be asserted against the "visitorial power of the state." Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911) . The corporation's inability to claim the privilege is related to the impersonal nature of the corporation. In United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) , the Court held that if an organization was "so impersonal in the scope of membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests only," then the organization could not claim the privilege. Id. at 701.
In addition, there is, of course, no danger of government abuse of the corporation by physical compulsion if the corporation is denied the privilege. It would be absurd to think of the corporation being subject to possible torture.
Finally, application of the privilege to the corporation would tend to weaken rather than increase respect for the judicial system. Whatever possibilities for a serious imbalance in power are inherent when the power of the state is pitted against an individual, these possibilities are much less likely when the state faces a corporation, which often has access to substantial resources. Furthermore, evidence of most corporate wrongdoing can usually be found in the corporation's official records and documents. See 8 J.
WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §'2259a (McNaughton rev. 1961) . "Were the cloak of privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible." United States v. White, 322 U.S. at 700. Respect for the judicial system would inevitably decline because of its inability to provide an effective means of uncovering corporate crime. Thus, since Hale, the Court has consistently denied the privilege to the corporation and there is no indication of any retreat from this position. Rather, the "corporate records" exception has been expanded to eleven questions, although asked in the context of an audit of the corporation's financial records, are not directed toward an examination of corporate records. Rather, they ask the corporation's officers and employees to provide answers, not corporate records or documents. Thus the corporate records exception will not prevent the officers and employees from claiming the privilege. However, their ability to claim the privilege may be affected by the second exception to the privilege, the self-reporting/required records exception. Just as the corporate records exception enables the government to gather information from a corporation, under the self-reporting/required records exception, the government may compel an individual to submit documents or reports. The self-reporting statutes and the required recbrds statutes are quite similar. Self-reporting or registration statutes are designed to elicit particular kinds of information from the individual. The individual is required to tender the desired information to the agency which regulates the activities described in the reports without waiting for a specific request for the information. Under a required records statute, an individual must merely keep the records available for inspection by the regulatory agency. If the agency desires access to the records, it may request or, if necessary, subpoena the records. Because the differences between the required records exception and the self-reporting exception are minimal, the two exceptions are now commonly considered to form a single required records exception to the privilege against self-incrimination .2 deny the privilege to other collective groups. The privilege has been denied to labor unions, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) When Shapiro produced his records, "[t]he presiding official stated that the 'witness is entitled to whatever immunity which flows as a matter of law fifth amendment privilege and assumed that he would receive a statutory grant of immunity from prosecution regarding the information in the subpoenaed records. However, when Shapiro was later tried for violating the Emergency Price Control Act, his claim of immunity was rejected. He appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, but the Court affirmed, holding that there was no privilege for Shapiro's required records. The Court assumed that there were "limits which the government cannot constitutionally exceed in requiring the keeping of records."-Accordingly, it attempted to limit the scope of its decision to records which had "public aspects.
3 6 Furthermore, the Court limited its holding to situations where there was a sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern so that the government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic activity concerned, and can constitutionally require the keeping of particular records . .7
Despite the Court's attempts to limit its decision, Shapiro had potentially far-reaching implications. The required records exception could very well have destroyed the fifth amendment privilege if a legislature, by requiring records to be kept, were able to overcome the privilege with regard to all such records. Justice Frankfurter criticized the reasoning involved in the Court's decision:
Subtle question-begging is nevertheless question-begging. Thus: records required to be kept by law are public records; public records are non-privileged; required records are non-privileged.
If records merely because required to be kept by law ipo facto become public records, we are indeed living in glass houses. Virtually every from the production of these books and records'."
Id. at 4. The statute which required the records to be kept provided that no one would be excused from compliance with the statute because of his privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, the statute provided that immunity would be available "to any individual who specifically claims such privilege." Id. at 10 n.7. Shapiro claimed the privilege. However, the Supreme Court held that under the required records doctrine Shapiro was not entitled to claim the privilege. Consequently the statute did not provide an) immunity to Shapiro. [i]n Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral on their face and directed at the public at large, but here they are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.
'
Furthermore, the Court found that Albertson's claim of privilege arose "in an area permeated with criminal statutes" and might lead to "the admission of a crucial element of a crime."" pational tax requirements on the grounds that the privilege "offers protection only as to past and present acts" and would not protect the prospective acts which Kahriger and Lewis later engaged in. 47 However, in light of its recently decided Albertson case, the Court felt compelled to reexamine the required records doctrine because "every portion of these requirements had the direct and unmistakable consequence of incriminating petitioner." ' 8 Noting the parallel to Albertson, the Court found that "wagering is 'an area permeated with criminal statutes,' and those engaged in wagering are a group 'inherently suspect of criminal activities'." 4 9 While the Court acknowledged the government's ability to tax unlawful activities, the Court focused particularly on the fact that the information that a gambler had paid the occupational tax was "readily available to assist the efforts of state and federal authorides to enforce these [criminal] penalties." 5 Furthermore, evidence of compliance with federal wagering tax laws was "often . . . admitted at trial in state and federal prosecutions for gambling offences."'" In Marchetti, the Court contrasted the petitioner's situation with that of Shapiro, stating: "Each of the three principal elements of the doctrine, as it is described in Shapiro is absent from this situation. 5 2 First, Marchetti was required to keep and preserve records which he had not customarily kept. Second, there were no public aspects to the information sought. Third, the information sought was not related to "an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inqtiry. ' ' 53 Declaring that the "central standard for the privilege's application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary hazards of incrimination, 5 4 the Court overturned Mar-47 390 U.S. at 52. The Court's rationale in Lewis was also based on a theory of implied waiver. Under the implied waiver theory, when Lewis decided to engage in gambling, he surrendered his fifth amendment privilege. Marchetti rejected both the "non-prospective" and waiver theories. See 390 U.S. at 50-54. chetti's and Grosso's convictions. Kahriger and Lewis, which had barred the assertion of the privilege, were overruled.
5
Subsequent to Marchetti and Grosso, in California v. Byers, 5 6 the Court again faced the question whether the fifth amendment could be claimed as a defense for failing to comply with a registration requirement. In Byers, the respondent was charged with failing to stop and leave his name and address after being involved in an automobile accident which had resulted in property damage. Byers claimed that the reporting requirement violated his privilege against self-incrimination. Although the California Supreme Court had sustained Byers' claim, the United States Supreme Court rejected it.
A plurality of the Court found no conflict between the statutory reporting scheme and the privilege. The plurality reviewed the "substantial hazards of self-incrimination" 57 test formulated in Marchetti. Since the California statute was directed at all persons who drive automobiles in California, the plurality found it "difficult to consider this group as either 'highly selective' or 'inherently suspect of criminal activities'." ' In addition, the plurality noted that the California Supreme Court had construed the statute as "not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents." 5 9 Reasoning that "disclosures with respect to automobile accidents simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk involved in Marchetti [and] Grosso "60 the plurality sustained the reporting requirement.
Mr. Justice Harlan's concurrence provided a majority for the result reached in Byers. However, his approach was significantly different from that of the plurality. Justice Harlan acknowledged that Marchetti and Grosso suggested that "the applicability of the privilege depends exclusively on a determination that, from the individual's point of view, there are 'real' and not 'imaginary' risks of self-incrimination in yielding to state compulsion."' 6 But, un- like the plurality, Justice Harlan acknowledged that there were real risks present in Byers. He criticized the plurality for "indulging in a collection of artificial, if not disingenuous judgments that the risks of incrimination are not there when they really are there ."62 Justice Harlan felt that Byers would have faced a real risk of self-incrimination by complying with the reporting statute. He thought that if the plurality had more honestly applied the "real risk" standard it espoused, Byers' conviction would not have been sustained. Furthermore, he reasoned that a logical application of the "real risk" standard must either protect "all personal judgments which are not patently frivolous" or lead to "a grant of immunity potentially applicable to all instances of compelled 'self-reporting.' "63 But Justice Harlan was dissatisfied with the logical implications of the "real risk" standard and articulated a rationale for reaching the same result that the plurality had reached. Noting the tension between the government's need for information and the individual's privilege against self-incrimination, he maintained that respect for the integrity of the individual and concern for individual privacy, values fostered by the privilege, 64 were not "of such overriding significance that they compel substantial sacrifices in the pursuit of other governmental objectives in all situations" where disclosure would contribute significantly to criminal law enforcement. He feared that if an individual's own perception of self-incrimination were sufficient to impose use restrictions on the government in all selfreporting contexts, then the privilege threatens the capacity of the government to respond to societal needs with a realistic mixture of criminal sanctions and other regulatory devices.6
Consequently, he suggested that explicit limits be placed on the Marchetti-Grosso line of cases (including the plurality opinion in Byers an evaluation of the assertedly noncriminal governmental purpose in securing the information, the necessity for self-reporting as a means of securing the informaion, and the nature of the disclosures required.
67
In discussing the first factor, the "governmental purpose in securing the information," Justice Harlan focused on whether those under a statutory duty to report were "inherently suspect." Although he considered that those required to report under the Byers hit-and-run statute could not be characterized as inherently suspect, 8 he suggested "that the 'inherentlysuspect-class' factor is relevant only as an indicium of genuine risk as assessed from the individual's point of view." 69 Thus, while noting "the regulatory scheme's concededly non-criminal purpose, ' 70 Justice Harlan still maintained that it posed "genuine risks of self-incrimination from the driver's point of view. Perhaps because he may have regarded the necessity for self-reporting as obvious in the hit-and-run context, 72 Justice Harlan neglected to make explicit how his second factor applied. He simply concluded that self-reporting was a necessary means of securing the information.
Regarding the third factor, the nature of the disclosures required, Justice Harlan emphasized that under the California hit-and-run statute, a minimal level of disclosure was required. Even after the driver stopped and left his name and address, the state still had to investigate further to determine whether the driver's involvement in the accident was proximately related to the criminal behavior. Thus, the state still bore a significant and not merely ritualistic "burden of making the main evidentiary case" '73 to violate his Orivilege against self-incrimination.
On the basis of the Court's analysis in the above cases it is difficult to know whether the self-reporting/required records exception will or will not operate to compel corporate officers and employees to answer the eleven questions. Initially it should be noted that if the privilege is not recognized for the individual officer or employee to whom the questions are addressed and if he fears that his response may incriminate him, he is faced with the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.1 74 A truthful answer may be the equivalent of selfaccusation and lead to criminal penalties for the commission of"a crime. A false answer may lead to a perjury prosecution because the officer or employee is required to sign his written answers to the questions "in either affidavit form or as a written declaration made under the penalities of perjury.
' 75 An individual who willfully makes a false statement on such a form is subject to prosecution under either section 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code or under 18 U.S.C. §1001.76 Finally, silence could lead either to criminal penalties or to a contempt penalty. If the officer or employee refuses to answer the eleven questions, he could be prosecuted under section 7203 for failure to supply information requested by the IRS. Alternatively, the IRS could issue a summons 74 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964 However, even in the absence of a statutory or regulatory authorization for the eleven questions, the "cruel trilemma" remains. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970) , anyone who willfully makes false, fiaudulent or fictitious statements regarding "any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States" can be fined and imprisoned.
1978]
under section 760277 directing him to testify. If he persists in his refusal to testify, the IRS can sue for enforcement of the summons under section 7604, and then a district court judge could find the officer or employee to be in contempt and punish him accordingly.
7 8 Under section 7602 the officer or employee might also be summoned to appear before a grand jury to testify. Similarly, in the grand jury situation the officer or employee would potentially face the cruel trilemma 7 9
Under the self-reporting/required records exception, however, this risk to the individual must be considered in light of the government's need for information. Under the substantial hazards-real risk test, as applied by the Byers plurality, it is necessary to ask whether the target group (here officers and employees of a large corporation) forms a "highly selective" group "inherently suspect of criminal activities."
80 Unfortunately, the Byers plurality opinion give little guidance regarding what is meant by a "highly selective" group. The plurality indicated that the target group was "all persons who drive automobiles in California" 81 and that this group was essentially equivalent to the public at large. But this group of drivers is actually a group selected out of the general populace. Furthermore, the statute chose drivers involved in accidents causing property damage as the actual target group-a group not only more selective but also more "inherently suspect of criminal activities" than drivers in " Under § 7602, the Secretary .of the Treasury or his delegate is authorized, for the purpose of determining the correctness of a tax return or the amount of tax due. " [t] 402 U.S. at 431 (Burger, CJ., plurality opinion).
x' Id. at 430.
general. Thus a reasonable 'argument could have been made that the group in Byers met the "highly selective-inherently suspect" criteria.
2 In applying the Byers plurality's "highly selective-inherently suspect" test to the officers and employees of large corporations who are asked to respond to the eleven questions, it is possible to argue either that they belong to a group which is permissibly selective or to a group which is impermissibly "highly selective." It could be argued, for instance, that the officers and employees of these corporations are not members of a highly selective group since the IRS follows a pattern of subjecting larger corporations to an ever-increasing likelihood of a tax audit. For example, in 1975, corporations with assets under $50,000 had only a 3.2% chance of being audited; however, corporations with assets over $100 million had an 82.1% chance of being audited."' Since there is clearly a greater potential for increased revenue collection from the larger corporations, the IRS's greater concern for auditing large corporations is understandable and well within its valid regulatory role. On this basis then, the selectivity of the eleven questions would appear to be comparable to the level of selectivity found to be permissible in Byers. Under the Byers statute, all drivers involved in accidents causing property damage were required to report; under the eleven questions, key officers and employees of all corporations with assets above $250 million are required to report. On the other hand, the questions are directed at a relatively small group-if one considers the population at large. They are directed at corporations of a size which can afford to pay significant bribes or wield untoward political influence-as opposed to all corporations. They are also directed at those within the corporation likely to have knowledge of these activities. But these individuals are also the ones most likely to have been involved in illegal activity. Although the IRS employs a selective process in directing the 
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funds," 8 4 this level of selectivity should not, of itself, require this group to be characterized as impermissibly selective. It would be highly impractical to require that the IRS's eleven questions be addressed to everyone of a large corporation's employees to avoid being "highly selective." A level of selectivity based on the officer's or employee's presumed "authority, control or knowledge" merely represents an efficient utilization of the IRS's resources. Furthermore, while some corporate officers and employees might have engaged in criminal activities, the entire group would not be considered to be inherently suspect of criminal activities. Consequently, as a group, the corporate officers and employees stand in sharp contrast to the members of the Communist party in Albertson and the gamblers in Marchetti and Grosso. In Albertson, everyone who registered and admitted membership in the Communist party would have been directly confessing an element of a crime.
5 Similarly, in Marchetti and Grosso, everyone who registered or paid the occupational tax would have "subjected him[self] to possible state or federal prosecution."
' 6 By contrast, the majority of corporate officers and employees who respond to the eleven questions are not suspect of any crime and do not face the threat of prosecution. Thus, although the conclusion is not free from all doubt, if the Byers plurality's approach were used to determine whether the corporate officer.1 and employees faced a real risk of selfincrimination, it is probable that a court would find that the officers do not form a "highly selective" group that is "inherently suspect." 390 U.S. at 47. 8 A preliminary report by the IRS on the status of its 11 questions investigation revealed that out of responses by 896 corporations, only 71 showed evidence of possible criminal fraud. DAILY TAX RE-PORT (BNA), June 6, 1977 at G-7. Thus as a group, the corporate officers-and employees would appear not to be "inherently suspect."
" Regardless of whether one characterizes corporate officials as a select group, the real problem with the Byers plurality's approach is that, in effect, it equates a finding that there is a real risk of' selfincrimination with a finding that there is a "highly The officers face no real risk by answering the questions.
Under the alternative Byers approach proposed by Justice Harlan, the analytical starting point is to see whether there is "an assertedly noncriminal governmental purpose in securing the information." 8' 9 With regard to tax collection procedures, the courts have generally presumed such a non-criminal purpose. For example, in Grosso the Court declared, "[t]he principal interest of the United States must be assumed to be the collection of revenue." 0 While the presumption of a valid regulatory purpose is rebuttable, it would seem that the IRS would have little difficulty in establishing that there is a valid regulatory, non-criminal purpose to the eleven questions. The IRS is interested in ascertaining the proper amount of tax due. Although the IRS's questions are directed to the corporation's officers and employees, their answers relate directly to whether the corporation has taken any illegal deductions. By statute, deductions are not allowed for certain types of payments 92 and the IRS fulfills its regulatory duty when it checks to see that no improper deductions are taken. Nonetheless, although the underlying purpose of the questions relates to a valid regulatory duty, the questions, in their present form, are not narrowly directed at the problem of illegal deductions.
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selective" group "inherently suspect of criminal activities." If the latter doesn't exist, neither does the former. Yet a determination that a group is "highly selective" or "inherently suspect" is merely one factor in the determination of whether a member of the group faces a real risk. It is quite possible that members of groups which are not highly selective or inherently suspect may still face substantial hazards of self-incrimination. For example, regardless of the selectivity of the group, the amount of regulation that a group is subject to can affect the amount of risk faced by the group members who are required to file a statment. In United States v. Whitehead, 424 F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1970) , Judge McCree, dissenting in part, noted that while distillers did. not constitute a "group inherently suspect of criminal activities," they were "involved in a business which is subject to extensive state and federal controls." Consequently, he reasoned that "compliance with the disclosure provisions of the alcohol tax laws" would create a risk of self-incrimination that was not "merely trifling or imaginary." Id. Justice Harlan's second factor, "the necessity for self-reporting as a means for securing the information" 9 : differentiates the eleven questions from the Byers situation. Although as in Byers, a driver involved in an accident might flee the scene leaving virtually no clue to his involvement, the IRS has alternative means of securing the information the eleven questions are aimed at uncovering. The corporate books and records can be examined by the IRS for clues of improper activities. While a routine audit might not uncover illegal ,corporate payments, a more intensive IRS audit of the corporate books and records would be more likely to uncover irregularities in the corporation's books. 94 In addition, corporate officers and employees not claiming the fifth amendment privilege would be required to render some on deductions and not on the broader topic of payment made by the corporation. Then the questions would relate directly to the tax liability of the corporation and the regulatory purpose of the questions becomes more apparent.
In The final factor to be considered in using the Harlan approach is the nature of the disclosure required. In Byers the disclosures were kept to a minimal level. Disclosure of only the name and address of the driver was required by the Byers reporting statute. However, under the eleven questions, the disclosures are of a more detailed nature and relate to an area in which there are numerous criminal statutes.
6
A corporate officer or employee who acknowledges that the corporation has engaged in bribes and kickbacks, or has in some way supported or opposed a foreign or domestic political candidate, might be incriminating himself. The fifth amendment provides a privilege against self-incrimination to anyone who is compelled to give an answer "which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant. ' 97 If the officer or employee revealed information about illegal activities in which he had himself participated, this information could be a "link in the chain of evidence" leading to his prosecution because it could be introduced into evidence as a party admission. 98 Thus, if the officer or employee could be compelled to respond to the eleven questions, the state's evidentiary burden might well be reduced to "a merely ritualistic confirmation of the 'conviction' secured through compliance with the reporting requirement."
99
If Justice Harlan's approach were utilized in the eleven questions situation, a corporate officer or employee who feared self-incrimination would be able to make a valid fifth amendment claim. Justice Harlan's second and third conditions for compelling testimony under a required records rationale are absent. Alternative " Under the eleventh of the 11 questions, these corporate officers and officials would be required to state whether they knew of any "present or former corporate officers, directors, employees or other persons acting on behalf of the corporation (who) may have knowledge" concerning the issues raised by the 11 questions. Internal Revenue News Release IR-1590 IR- , [1976 The court noted that there were effective safeguards against the use of compelled testimony in American courts by federal or state officials. Either the testimony could be excluded or the conviction set aside. By contrast, the witness who feared prosecution by a foreign government was protected by no such safeguards. If the United States had an extradition treaty or convention with a foreign government, a court would merely certify to the Secretary of State in an extradition proceeding whether the evidence was "sufficient to sustain the charge under the proper treaty or convention.1yu The court in certifying "probable cause" to allow extradition would not have an opportunity to pass upon the person's possible fifth amendment claims. The American court would have have no power to speculate upon the foreign government's possible violation of the defendant's fifth amendment rights. Also the court, in certifying whether extradition might take place, would not be abusing its judicial power by refusing to consider the defendant's fifth amendment claim during the extradition hearing, it would be "simply declining to interfere in an area of traditional executive control." 1 3 Because post-testimony control of information would be diffult if not impossible to maintain when foreign governments are involved, Cardassi decided it was necessary to avoid the problem of post-testimony control by refusing to order the witness to testify.
The position taken by the court in Cardassi appears to be more in harmony with Murphy Rule 6(e) specifically provides: "Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury . . . may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties." FED. R. CRI M. P. 6(e). Disclosure to United States Attorneys may lead to information leaks. In the context of the receipt of confidential tax information by United States Attorneys, a caution was raised: "United States Attorneys are political appointees. Consequently, reliance on Rule 6(e) is insufficient to protect the witness from the possibility of self-incrimination under the laws of a foreign country.
CONCLUSION
The eleven questions which the IRS is asking in its audits of the 1200 largest American corporations present the threat of subjecting the officers and employees of these corporations to the "cruel trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury or contempt. The self-reporting and required records exception to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination has, under certain circumstances, been able to overcome the individual's privilege. While both the theory and the application of the self-reporting and required records exception are still evolving, the approach suggested by Justice Harlan in Byers provides the most satisfying theoretical framework for an application of the exception. Under Justice Harlan's approach, the officers and employees would be able to claim the fifth amendment privilege.
If the government wants to obtain the testimony of the corporate officer or employee, it may be able to do so by offering him use immunity. However, use immunity will not provide an adequate protection to an individual who faces a substantial risk of prosecution under the laws of a foreign country. In this situation, the courts are divided on whether an individual who has been granted immunity can be compelled to testify. However, the better position appears to be the one which allows the individual to remain silent without fear of any penalty for his silence. 
